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AN EVALUATION FRAMEWORK FOR 
DRM 
Abstract: There have been numerous evaluations of DRM systems, and most of these evaluations 
have focused on the end user experience of DRM systems. However, some of the problems 
identified by these evaluations are not simply a result of business strategies by the various 
vendors, but caused by the underlying deficiencies in the DRM architectures themselves. For this 
reason, in addition to evaluating the user experience, there is a need to evaluate each DRM system 
as a software system. 
In this paper, we present 27 requirements, divided into three categories, drawn up from a number 
of different sources (from consumer requirements to DRM standardisation programmes) to create 
an evaluation framework for DRM. We then benchmark four different DRM systems (two media 
systems, two enterprise systems) against this framework, and identify some of the universal 
problems in current DRM systems. In our analysis, we find 4 major flaws with current DRM 
systems: the lack of user authentication, lack of device and platform portability due to the reliance 
of device based authentication, poor support for revocation and modification of access rights and 
a poor understanding of legal and social requirements from the developers of the DRM systems. 
Keywords: DRM, iTunes, Windows Media, Microsoft RMS, Adobe Document Security, DRM 
Requirements, DRM architectures 
1. Introduction 
There have been a number of articles (in academia such as [42], in the 
press and in blogs) evaluating different DRM systems. All these evaluations 
focus on the effects of the DRM system on the end user. Thus, these evaluations 
do not consider whether the system manages to block unauthorised uses, but 
rather how many devices the user can use to render protected content. As far as 
we know, there have been no technical evaluations of DRM systems. 
There are two primary motivations behind technical evaluations of DRM 
systems. Firstly, such an evaluation can potentially reveal the architecture of the 
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system, and thus explain some of the user experiences associated with such a 
DRM system. For example, Apple Inc.’s reluctance to license their DRM 
standard to rival manufacturers could be explained by the integration of the 
DRM architecture in the complete system, and thus may not simply be a 
reluctance to license the file formats.  
Secondly, an evaluation framework allows developers of existing and 
future systems to address the various gaps in existing systems. This is also a 
necessary step in any standardisation process. In this paper, we present an 
evaluation framework for DRM systems, drawing on requirements from a 
number of different sources (discussed in section 2). Our evaluation framework 
defines 27 requirements that need to be addressed by both enterprise and media 
DRM systems. We then use our evaluation framework to examine four different 
existing DRM systems. 
2. Sources for Requirements 
We have examined a number of different sources to draw up the 
requirements discussed in this paper. In [18], Bartolini et al. were one of the 
first to discuss requirements for content protection systems, and they were also 
one of the first to discus the parties involved in a DRM value chain. In [43], 
Park et al. discuss different taxonomies for content protection systems and a few 
technical requirements for DRM. 
There are a number of different organisations that have released 
comprehensive technical requirements for DRM. The requirements by 
Networked Audiovisual Systems and Home Platforms (NAVSHP) [8], the 
Digital Media Project (DMP) [10] and the TIRAMISU project [32] are quite 
comprehensive, but all focus specifically on media DRM systems. The 
requirements documents, especially from the DMP have gone through many 
iterations and refinements, and differ drastically from their initial versions [49]. 
Unfortunately, technical requirements rarely acknowledge legal or social 
requirements for DRM systems; and when they do specify such requirements, 
they are often vague and even contradictory. For example, conflicting needs 
specified by the TIRAMISU project are the need for detailed tracking and 
monitoring of content usage information and the need for user privacy. We have 
drawn our requirements for social and legal requirements from two main 
sources: Mulligan et al.’s evaluation of media DRM systems on the 
infringement of “personal use” in [42] and the Center for Democracy & 
Technology’s criteria for evaluating media DRM in [12]. 
There are two independent surveys that have investigated the respondents’ 
usage patterns for physical media, their habits and attitudes concerning digital 
piracy as well as their attitude to DRM and other content protection 
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mechanisms. The INDICARE project [26] was a comprehensive survey on 
European users, while Arnab and Hutchison’s survey in [16] investigated the 
relationships between the physical and digital media usage patterns. Some of 
our requirements are motivated by the results of these surveys. 
An additional source for requirements can be found in feature descriptions 
of enterprise DRM systems, particularly when they describe certain use cases. 
In most cases, these features are already covered in the other sources mentioned 
above, but the use cases often bring a unique perspective on the requirements. 
These documents include systems from Adobe [9], Authentica [17] and 
Microsoft [38]. 
3. Requirements 
We have categorised the requirements for DRM systems into three 
categories: core requirements for access control, usability requirements and 
legal and social requirements. 
3.1 Core Requirements for Access Control 
DRM is a form of access control, and thus every DRM system need to 
implement features that allow for access control. For any protected resource, 
access should only be granted if the consumer fulfils all the defined 
requirements associated with that resource. Should the resource be moved to a 
device which cannot interpret and enforce the access control policies, no access 
should be given. 
Requirement 1: Provide Persistent Protection: Access to the resource 
should only be granted when the consumer fulfils all the requirements set 
out by the access control policies. Furthermore, the resource should not be 
accessible if the device cannot interpret or enforce the access control 
policies. 
Access control is inherently a two part process – there is an authentication 
process, and once the parties have been authenticated, there is an authorisation 
process – i.e. is the person who they claim to be, and is that person allowed 
access to that resource. The user in a DRM system is not necessarily the end 
user, but includes any person (natural or legal) involved in a DRM system, such 
as the rights holder or a third party processing payment. 
Requirement 2: Represent User Identity: Before a user can be 
authenticated, the user must be identified. The user identity has to be 
globally unique, since DRM protection has to be applied globally. User 
identity is often closely associated with authentication protocols, and thus; 
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Requirement 3: Support multiple User Authentication Protocols: 
Authentication proves the validity of a claimed identity. Since there are 
already a number of existing secure authentication protocols, it is easier to 
accommodate these protocols than to create new authentication protocols. 
The user is not the only party in a DRM transaction. Because DRM aims to 
control the use of content, there is a need to identify and authenticate data 
content as well as the devices which wish to render the content. 
Requirement 4: Represent and Authenticate Resource Identity: To 
control access to a resource, the resource first needs to be identified in a 
globally unique scheme. Once a resource can be identified, there is also a 
need to verify the correctness of the association between the resource and its 
identity. 
Requirement 5: Represent and Authenticate Device Identity: To 
confine access to a resource to a particular device, there needs to be a 
mechanism to define the identity of the device. Once a device has been 
identified, there is a need to verify the correctness of the association 
between the device and its identity. 
While access control can be defined for an individual user, resource and 
device, it is also useful to control access through defined groups of users, 
resources and devices. For example, it could be useful to define location 
domain, such as a department in an enterprise, where data can be accessed. 
Furthermore, access control can also be defined though the function of the user 
in an organisation [27](or society) and this functionality should also be catered 
for in DRM. 
Requirement 6: Represent and Authenticate User Groups: There is 
a need to control access to data to a defined group of users, and there should 
be a mechanism to define and authenticate such a grouping. 
Requirement 7: Represent and Authenticate User Roles: There is a 
need to control access to data through a definition of the functionality/role 
played by the user in an organisation. There should be a mechanism to 
define and authenticate that the user belongs to the defined role. 
Requirement 8: Represent and Authenticate Resource Groups: 
There is a need to control access to data to a defined group of resources, and 
there should be a mechanism to define and authenticate such a grouping. 
Requirement 9: Represent and Authenticate Device Groups: There 
is a need to control access to data to a defined group of devices, and there 
should be a mechanism to define and authenticate such a grouping. 
The above requirements are all involved in authenticating the parties 
involved in a DRM transaction. Once the parties are authenticated, authorisation 
for the parties is required. 
Requirement 10: Represent the Authorisation (Use License): There 
is a need to define the authorisation for an individual person, group or role 
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to access one or more resources on one or a group of devices. The data unit 
that provides such an authorisation is hereby referred to as a use license 
Requirement 11: Authenticate the Use License: There is also a need 
to ensure that the authorisation is created by the appropriate party (the rights 
holders or one of their representative), as well as the integrity and 
correctness of the use license. 
Requirement 12: Support User Duties: Consumers may be required to 
perform certain actions before they are authorised access. For example, in a 
media DRM setting; the resource may have a limited free evaluation stage 
(e.g. shareware) and then the consumer is required to pay for further usage. 
Thus, the consumer would need to show proof of payment before getting 
authorisation for use. This scenario is not restricted to the media DRM 
scenario, and may also be required in an enterprise scenario; for example, a 
consumer may only be granted access to an application, once (s)he has 
passed the training for that application. 
Requirement 13: Revocation of Rights: Access control rights may 
need to be revoked for a number of reasons such as the consumer violating 
the terms of the agreement or the consumer getting a different use license 
for the same work. Thus, there needs to be an efficient mechanism to revoke 
access control rights; but at the same time revocation has to be controlled in 
a fair manner. 
Requirement 14: Update of Rights: Access control rights may need to 
be changed for a number of reasons such as the consumer acquiring an 
extension of the agreement beyond the stated period. Thus, there needs to be 
an efficient mechanism to update access control rights; but at the same time 
updates have to be controlled in a fair manner. 
We contend that the requirements discussed above constitute the core 
requirements for any DRM system, and define the minimum requirements for 
persistent access control. However, there are other requirements for general 
DRM systems which we are going to discuss in the remainder of this section. 
3.2 Usability Requirements 
There are a group of requirements that, though not strictly required to 
provide access control, are very desirable for a DRM system. These 
requirements, such as portability, are demanded from the users (producers and 
consumers) of the system and can be termed essential features required for a 
DRM system, and systems that have these features are likely to have more 
success and attract less criticism. 
Chief amongst this group of requirements is portability, and the lack of 
support for portability in DRM systems has attracted the most criticism in DRM 
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systems in academia [42], consumer groups [12][26], public comment [3] and 
the media [20, 11]. Mulligan et al. defined portability as: 
the ability to use acquired content on any suitable device, regardless of 
ownership in the device or its physical surroundings. Portability also refers 
to the ability to shift the format of a copy. [42] 
We believe that portability can be distinguished into four different 
categories, and each category can be seen as an individual requirement for any 
DRM system; although the importance of the requirements can vary between 
different applications of DRM. 
Requirement 15: Time Shifting: Time shifting refers to the ability of 
the DRM systems to regulate when the consumer accesses a protected work. 
In the media DRM space, time shifting could be used to rent works to 
consumers for limited time periods (similar to a movie rental or library). In 
the enterprise, access of corporate infrastructure at “odd hours” is already 
used in intrusion detection and other security infrastructure and time shifting 
restrictions in DRM could be used in a similar vein. 
Requirement 16: Format Shifting: Format shifting refers to the ability 
of the DRM systems to regulate the consumer’s ability to change the format 
of the data file (without affecting the access control rules), and Mulligan et 
al. argued that it is an important portability issue in media DRM systems 
[42]. Format shifting could be important in an enterprise for similar reasons 
– for example, the enterprise could keep internal data stored in a certain 
format and in a different format when released to other companies or even 
to the public (in the case of financial statements for example). Format 
shifting should also allow for easier integration between different 
applications across different platforms. 
Requirement 17: Space Shifting: Space shifting refers to the ability of 
the DRM systems to regulate which devices the consumer can use to access 
the protected resource. Space shifting operates within the same type of 
device and operating system.  
Requirement 18: Platform Shifting: Platform shifting refers to the 
availability of a DRM system across multiple devices and operating 
systems. In a world with multiple types of convergent devices, users can 
expect to access protected resources on mobile phones, portable computers, 
desktop computers and hand-held computers to name a few. Each of these 
devices also supports a number of different operating systems, sometimes 
from the same vendor. Thus, platform shifting refers to the DRM systems 
ability to support multiple operating systems and devices. 
For portability, DRM systems need to be able to support the regulation of 
time shifting, format shifting and space shifting while implementations of DRM 
systems need to support the implementation of platform shifting. There are 
7 
requirements other than portability which can be grouped under usability 
requirements, and we discuss them next. 
Requirement 19: Integration with Existing Applications: Current 
DRM systems introduce their own applications in order to enforce the 
access control policies. This strategy is however not feasible in the long 
term: in the media DRM space, consumers want the choice for which 
applications they want to use, because of familiarity or features provided by 
these applications. Similarly, enterprises often use software developed for 
their specific needs and resources that need to be protected are not 
necessarily generated by applications supplied by current vendors of DRM 
systems. 
Requirement 20: Delegation of Rights: At least one user has to have 
the right to delegate rights to other users (e.g. an author has to be able to 
delegate the right to view to a reader); but there is a need to control 
delegation of rights. We are however interested in delegation of rights after 
the initial delegation, and if possible, all aspects of delegation must be 
possible. Delegation of rights could also include the transfer of rights (either 
temporary or permanent) between consumers of a work. A permanent 
transfer of rights can effectively be seen as a revocation followed by a 
granting of rights, without the rights holder exerting additional payment (or 
other duties). 
Requirement 21: Fine Grained and Flexible Access Control 
Specification: The use cases for DRM systems in general demand fine 
grained access control – not just control on the traditional read, write and 
execute but also application specific controls. Furthermore, restrictions on 
specific controls would also be preferred. Because of the variety of use 
cases for DRM, there is also a need to create flexible access control 
specification, with the definition of the controls differing according to the 
use cases. 
Requirement 22: Tracking and Monitoring: Although not a feature of 
DRM itself, monitoring the access and usage patterns of users (both 
consumers and producers) can be easily achieved. In an enterprise, 
monitoring the usage of confidential data is crucial, and should 
compromises to security take place, access logs and usage patterns would be 
very useful in tracking down the source of the compromise.  
However, with the ability to track and monitor usage, privacy does 
become a concern. Monitoring employee activity in the workplace is 
already a contentious issue, while monitoring consumers in media DRM 
systems could be illegal in some countries, and already attracts criticism in 
academia [42] and the public [3]. Thus, the ability to track and monitor 
usage is only desired in certain applications of DRM, and care needs to be 
taken to stay within the boundaries of appropriate monitoring. 
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Requirement 23: Offline Usage: Communication networks are not 
perfect, and there are many situations where consumers (or even producers) 
may not have access to the Internet (for example on an aeroplane), or may 
need to access resources on devices which have no connectivity (such as the 
current generation of Apple iPods). Thus offline usage is desirable; but does 
have its drawbacks – offline usage reduces monitoring and tracking 
capabilities; and may also limit the control desired. For example in an 
enterprise, if an employee is fired and the employee has protected data that 
can be accessed offline, the employee could still retain access to the 
protected data. Generally, online usage could be required periodically but 
not necessarily all the time for operation 
3.3 Legal and Social Requirements 
Ultimately, transactions regulated in a DRM system are governed by 
applicable laws. When disputes do occur, the only fair solution to the 
disputes can be found through arbitration or the courts. However, current 
DRM systems (and arguably most computer systems) do not consider the 
legal implications of the services they provide; nor do they have clearly 
identifiable legal frameworks under which they operate. 
Requirement 24: A Legal Framework for DRM: There is a need 
to identify and position DRM systems, and the transactions in a DRM 
system, in a comprehensive legal framework. The legal framework 
should address concerns relating to copyright law and fair use and 
personal uses such as portability and archiving. 
Consumer organisations have also commented on some of the 
requirements for media DRM systems with respect to features consumers 
expect from DRM systems. Some of these requirements can be addressed as 
part of a legal framework, while other requirements do not necessarily have 
any legal backing. These requirements also apply (although at times, to a 
lesser degree) to enterprise DRM systems. 
Requirement 25: Transparency: DRM systems should clearly 
disclose the restrictions imposed. The restrictions should be available to 
the user before the resource is acquired, and the user should also have 
the means to view the restrictions during use. Furthermore, the 
restrictions should be clearly stated and documented, and not hidden 
away in complex agreements and user agreements. 
Requirement 26: Privacy and Anonymity: The requirement for 
privacy and anonymity, goes against a previously stated requirement for 
monitoring and tracking. While both can co-exist in the same system, a 
system that provides tracking and monitoring cannot claim to provide 
complete user privacy and vice versa. However, some parts of both are 
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required for generalised DRM systems, and the range of the features 
implemented will depend on the exact application. 
If monitoring and tracking are implemented, the user must be 
informed of what data is being collected, how the collected data is going 
to be used, who will have access to the collected data and how long the 
collected data will be stored. 
Requirement 27: Do Not Alter Platform Functionality and 
Performance: Implementation of a DRM system should not drastically 
alter the functionality or performance of the whole system for non-
protected works. This includes the introduction of security loopholes 
through the DRM system, or the need for additional software or 
hardware to regain functionality or performance. 
4. Evaluation of Existing Systems 
In this section we evaluate 4 existing DRM systems against the 
requirements we discussed in the earlier section. For each system, we give an 
overview of the players involved in the system, how protected files are 
assembled and how access controls are enforced. For the requirement analysis, 
we use a simple 3 point rating system for each requirement, defined below. The 
ratings are then used to compare different systems, and identify which 
requirements are least satisfied by current DRM systems. 
0 : The requirement is not supported at all. 
1 : There is limited support for the requirement. 
2 : The requirement is supported in full. 
The requirement analysis is done with respect to the DRM system itself and 
what is possible with the DRM system, and not what is expected by consumers 
or consumer organisations. Certain requirements could be considered fully met 
in design but have no support in implementations. In these cases, we often score 
the systems as limited support, especially if the decisions behind non-
implementation are driven by the vendor’s business model and practices; and 
not because of adequate market demand. Due to space constraints, we present 
only one consolidated table with our ratings in section  4.5. 
4.1 Apple iTunes Music Store 
In March 2003, Apple Computers debuted the Apple iTunes Music Store1 
which allowed customers to download individual music tracks for 99 US cents, 
and whole albums for US $9.99. Within one year, iTunes Music Store had 
become the dominant online music store, selling over 50 million songs [23] and 
it currently commands the majority of legal online music downloads [28]. With 
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over 2 billion downloaded songs, 50 million TV episodes and 1.3 Million movie 
downloads, it can be considered to be the most successful DRM system [15]. 
Apple’s iTunes Music Service is a proprietary system, and the details we 
present below are compiled from the user documentation provided by Apple 
[13], and from some well known compromises of the system – Playfair 
(subsequently renamed Hymn) [1][4][5] and PyMusique [51][47] and its 
successor SharpMusique [29]. 
4.1.1 Brief Overview 
iTunes DRM system can be considered as a set of two services. Initially, 
iTunes started as a music player system for Apple Macintosh, and later became 
the interface between the Apple Macintosh and their portable music player, the 
iPod. iTunes (the software) has evolved to become a comprehensive media 
player, and is available on Microsoft Windows and Apple Mac OS operating 
systems. The second part of the system is the iTunes Music store, which sells 
music, audio books, movies and TV episodes. All media sold on the music store 
is protected by the Apple DRM system known as FairPlay, which is the focus of 
our discussion. 
When a user first registers in the iTunes Music Store, a digital certificate, 
including a key, is generated for that machine. We believe that this certificate is 
signed by the iTunes Music Store. Currently, the user can register five machines 
in total, which would all carry the same digital certificate. It is possible to 
deregister the machine (thereby removing the key from the key store), but it is 
not possible to register beyond the maximum – even if those machines are no 
longer registered. 
When protected data (currently music and video) is transferred to a portable 
device (currently only the Apple iPod is supported), the digital certificate 
associated with the data is also transferred. It is therefore possible to utilise data 
from different users on the portable device. 
There are no other keys or digital certificates involved in the iTunes Music 
Service, and thus Apple manages to keep a very tight control over the chain of 
trust. However, the short chain (only two types of keys) introduces its own 
problems, primarily with regards to portability. Using the primary key (on the 
iTunes service) provides no user authentication; and thus any data that is 
protected with the key is accessible to every registered user. Thus, the iTunes 
service utilises the user key to protect content, requiring user authentication to 
access data. This means that portability between different users is not possible; 
a limitation which will affect every user who reaches their maximum limit on 
registered computers. 
A flaw in the system, uncovered by PyMusique, is that the protection of 
content does not occur on the iTunes server; presumably because it would 
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require the iTunes service to keep track of all the keys. Instead, the protection is 
only applied once the data is downloaded to the registered computer. 
PyMusique and SharpMusique took advantage of this flaw, and interacted with 
the iTunes music server directly, but did not protect the data once it was 
downloaded. 
In late 2006, the protocol used by iTunes to interact with iTunes Music 
Store changed, and SharpMusique no longer works [29]. Hymn (also known as 
PlayFair) is a more direct attack on the service, where the user’s key is 
recovered from the portable device and used to decrypt the protected content. 
Once the data is decrypted, the user can do what they wish with the content. 
4.1.2 Core Requirement Analysis 
FairPlay cannot be considered a complete DRM system. Its primary 
protection relies on secure distribution, which has already been compromised. 
Furthermore, the user identity system is basic, and two different users cannot be 
accommodated on the same iTunes system directly (it is possible to cater for 
two different users if they use different user profiles on the consuming 
computer’s operating system). Furthermore, even though Apple is introducing 
iTunes enabled media into other areas of the home through products such as 
Apple TV2, mechanisms to manage device or user groups do not exist. And 
even though music is sold as albums, songs are effectively treated as individual 
and not as a group of resources. This could be due to the fact that the system 
does not make use of any licensing structure. Revocation of rights is also poorly 
supported, and only allows the complete revocation of user’s rights and not 
selective revocation. The rights profile can be updated (and have changed since 
the inception of the store), but requires an update to the iTunes software, and 
users who do not update their software do not get the updated rights profile.  
4.1.3 Usability Requirement Analysis 
Portability is often seen as a major consumer problem with DRM and 
FairPlay scores interesting ratings with respects to portability. FairPlay 
currently does not have any time shifting restrictions imposed on the user – 
once the user downloads a song or video clip, they can render it however often 
they wish. The subscription model, which requires time shifting is not supported 
in FairPlay, although rumours of such as a service have been reported by the 
media [22][31]. Since we do not have access to any internal documentation on 
FairPlay, we assume that Time Shifting is simply not supported, and future 
support will require an update of the iTunes service. 
FairPlay is openly acknowledged as a DRM wrapper, thus there is no reason 
why multiple format types cannot be accommodated, or why format conversion 
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cannot be performed between these different formats. However, only two 
formats are currently implemented: AAC for audio and Quicktime Video for 
video. Likewise, limited platform portability is supported through the evidence 
of support for different operating systems and the iPod, but the support remains 
tightly controlled. Space shifting however is well supported. 
Apart from Offline Usage, where FairPlay does not require any Internet 
connection other than for initial acquisition of media, other usability 
requirements are not catered for by FairPlay. iTunes does not support delegation 
of rights, and the lack of licensing structure means that there are no fine grained 
access controls. With the tight integration of iTunes software, other applications 
are ignored and the iTunes music store claims that it does not track or monitor 
usage of protected works. 
4.1.4 Legal and Social Requirement Analysis 
While it is well known that the iTunes Music store sells media to the general 
public, the exact legal position of the store is, at best unknown, and has attracted 
legal attacks in some countries like Norway [46], which would like to force 
portability of FairPlay beyond the iPod. If iTunes sells media under copyright 
law, then a number of functions allowed under copyright are not permitted and 
that means it can be considered as illegal. If it is under a licensing system, then 
do they fulfil the requirements necessary for concluding valid contracts? Thus, 
with an unclear and unknown legal position, it scores a 0 rating for the legal 
framework rating. 
iTunes Music store is very transparent in identifying all the restrictions 
placed by iTunes, but does not provide much detail on how much personal data 
is collected (sales records etc) or if data is correlated to keep track of general 
trends. Apple does have a comprehensive privacy policy, and is easily available 
to all users [14], and thus our higher score. Finally, studies have shown that 
battery life of portable media players diminishes faster when playing DRM 
enabled media when compared to non DRM enabled media [30], but that is 
understandable considering the extra CPU operations required to render the 
media. Apple iPod had one of the lowest reported degradation in performance, 
and hence the full rating. 
4.2 Microsoft Windows Media (WM) 
Recent versions of Microsoft’s Windows Media (WM) Audio and Windows 
Media Video were designed to compete with iTunes Music Store and thus 
feature DRM protection. Unlike Apple, Microsoft’s initial strategy was to 
support multiple online music stores and multiple portable media players. But, 
even though the formats are supported by one vendor; different versions support 
different features and are often incompatible. Microsoft’s first release, Windows 
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Media 9, did not support automatic time shifting expiry and was confined to 
online connectivity only [33]. This was solved in a subsequent release, “Play 
For Sure”. This is possibly the most widely used version, and is supported by 
many device manufacturers and online music stores. More recently, Microsoft 
released yet another specification, which is incompatible with “Play For Sure”, 
and geared towards its own portable device player, Zune [2][50]. With this 
strategy, it seems that Microsoft is trying to emulate Apple’s tight integration 
strategy.  
In this section, we primarily discuss “Play For Sure”, although all three 
versions use a similar architecture. Like iTunes, Windows Media is a 
proprietary solution, although there is a lot more documentation available on its 
operation than iTunes’ operation. We use documentation released by Microsoft 
[37][41][34][35][45][36][44] and reports on the breaking of the protection 
(through a tool FairUse4WM) in [21] and the original details posted in [25] and 
an earlier attack using a tool DrmDbg [24]. 
4.2.1 Brief Overview 
Unlike Apple, Microsoft has chosen not to control the distribution and 
licensing components of the DRM system. Furthermore, because the playback 
libraries can be licensed, theoretically, playback is possible in a wide range of 
platforms and devices. 
One of the key features of the Microsoft approach is the default support for 
super distribution – it does not matter how the consumer acquires the media, but 
to access the media, the consumer will require a license. However, the licenses 
are non transferable, and usually tied to the device. This approach severely 
limits portability, as consumers cannot use multiple devices even if the 
consumer owns these devices.  
Unlike iTunes, DRM protected media files are encrypted before 
distribution. The key to access these files are distributed through the use license. 
Licenses also carry a revocation list of consuming devices that should be 
refused access to the protected media. Because the licenses are locked to the 
consuming device, there is no need for user authentication. Unfortunately, 
neither the public documentation nor the break indicate conclusively whether 
the use license itself is encrypted. 
The documentation does confirm that the use licenses are signed by the 
licensors. The licensors’ root certificates in turn have to be signed by Microsoft 
directly. This means, that while, Microsoft may not control the entire DRM 
value chain, they still control the chain of trust. This also means that Microsoft 
ultimately can decide which licensors to trust, and can refuse licensors a signed 
certificate, thereby refusing them access to utilise the Windows Media DRM 
system. 
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Like Hymn, FairUse4WM (based on an earlier attack DrmDbg) is a direct 
attack, extracting the key(s) from the licenses and then extracting the content 
from the protected package. 
4.2.2 Core Requirement Analysis 
Since protection offered by WM is not distribution dependent, it offers a 
more persistent access control protection. However, like iTunes FairPlay, there 
is no provision for individual user identity, and instead user identity is replaced 
by device identity. Also, like iTunes FairPlay, there is no provision to identify 
groups of devices, resources or users; and revocation of rights is tied to the 
device, and not individual rights or resources. Unlike iTunes FairPlay, WM 
does make use of use licenses and these use licenses are authenticated through 
the digital signature of the issuer. However, there does not seem to be any 
mechanism to verify the authenticity of the issuer (whether it is still trusted for 
example) or whether the license issuer can differ from the actual packager of the 
media (i.e. can an artist package the media him(her)self and then use music 
stores to market and sell licenses?). Rights can be updated through the issuing 
of a new license, but we are not aware of any media store that supports such a 
practice. Since current revocations are based on device rather than license, we 
are not sure if license revocation is possible. 
4.2.3 Usability Requirement Analysis 
Initially, WM was used exclusive in subscription business models, and thus 
time shifting was a key feature, although this initially required online 
connectivity. Like iTunes FairPlay, WMuses a wrapper and thus it potentially 
can support other media formats. However, no other implementations exist, and 
thus cannot be verified any further. Unlike Apple, Microsoft has been more 
liberal in allowing WM to be incorporated into other devices and platforms. 
However, the recent change with Zune, and because of the fact that Microsoft 
can still refuse to license to any vendor they wish, we have lowered the platform 
shifting scores. Since WM is based on a set of libraries, it is possible to render 
media on compatible software that makes use of the libraries, although not all 
applications may work. Because media licenses are device specific, space 
shifting is not possible under most schemes.  
Even though WM does feature a licensing mechanism, the lack of individual 
users make fine grained access control difficult, and this difficulty is 
compounded by a relatively small set of access control primitives. Without user 
identification, delegation is also not possible. WM does support tracking and 
monitoring support, but the extent is not documented; and both “Play For Sure” 
and Zune versions support offline usage. 
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4.2.4 Legal and Social Requirement Analysis 
As with Apple iTunes FairPlay, there is no legal certainty to the legal 
position of online media stores using WM. Furthermore, because individual 
media stores set their own privacy policies, and their own disclosure rules, we 
cannot rate these factors. With regard to performance and battery life, the 
reviews mentioned earlier found that WM enabled devices fared the worst, 
losing battery life up to 25% faster [30]. This is significantly higher than the 
iPod and thus our lower rating. 
4.3 Microsoft Rights Management Services (RMS) 
Microsoft’s Rights Management Services (RMS) is a DRM system geared 
for the enterprise, and is the only DRM system we are aware of that has access 
control support in the operating system kernel. In this section, we examine the 
effectiveness of RMS as a general DRM system. RMS is also a proprietary 
solution, but like for Windows Media, there is a lot documentation released by 
Microsoft that can be used to examine the system [39][38][40]. We have also 
used Rosenblatt’s comparative analysis of RMS and Authentica ARM [48] to 
confirm our own analysis. However, unlike WM and iTunes FairPlay, we do not 
know of any compromises that can reveal any additional information on RMS’ 
operations. 
4.3.1 Brief Overview 
RMS can be used to protect any type of data, although its user 
authentication design has meant that it is used primarily for intra-enterprise use. 
Like Windows Media, RMS does not have any restrictions on distribution, but 
cannot really be super distributed. Although the use license is distributed 
separately, the restrictions on which user(s) (or user groups) can access the data 
is linked to the data itself. Thus, it is not possible for a user to acquire a license 
for the data, if they do not have preallocated access. 
To use RMS in an enterprise, the enterprise must first set up an 
infrastructure of trusted entities. At the core of this set-up is a local certification 
authority that can create other trusted entities. For this purpose, RMS requires a 
server (running Windows Server 2003) to be enrolled as a trusted server. Like 
with Windows Media DRM, this server requires its public/private key pair to be 
signed by Microsoft directly, through its RMS Server Enrolment Server. Once 
this is done, the server can act as a certificate authority for the enterprise, and 
enrol other servers (license servers, active directory for authentication and other 
certificate authorities), client machines and users as certified entities. The local 
trust server does not need to be connected to the machines once they have been 
enrolled as trusted entities. 
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Client machines require the installation of a RMS operating system 
component (which enforces some of the license conditions) and RMS-aware 
applications which can interact with the RMS operating system component. 
RMS-aware applications can assemble and use protected data. 
4.3.2 Core Requirement Analysis 
UnlikeWindows Media, RMS does feature user identification through the 
use of Microsoft Active Directory or through Passport. Using Active Directory 
also allows the enterprise to regulate usage through the use of groups or roles. 
However, the use of Active Directory does mean that there is little scope for 
portability outside the enterprise, as any such measure would require the 
external systems to be within the trust realm and the user identities have to be 
integrated with the enterprise’s Active Directory. Passport is not really a viable 
choice considering its poor security history [19]. More recent versions of RMS 
also allow for authentication through X.509 certificates, but the addition of 
other identification mechanisms during deployment is not possible. The trusted 
realms allow for device identification, but do not seem to cater for grouping 
devices under different security levels or categories. 
RMS enabled data itself does not have versioning control by default, thus 
there is no way to distinguish between different versions of a document without 
opening the document. This has potential for problems if a user is allowed to 
access one version but excluded from the other version (for example the user is 
allowed to access version 1 but not version 2). If the use license is not forced to 
be renewed, then the user should be able to continue accessing both versions. 
The use of dual licenses (an embedded license with the data, and an external 
use license), both of which are required, is puzzling; especially as it thwarts 
easier portability, rights revocation and renewal or extension of license terms. 
For example, update of rights is allowed, but requires the document to be 
repackaged with the new conditions and then redistributed to the recipient. Even 
with high speed networks, this can be impractical, especially considering the 
size of certain documents such as high resolution images or presentations. 
4.3.3 Usability Requirement Analysis 
Space shifting is easily possible, as the use licenses are not tied to specific 
devices, and because RMS does not specify formats, format shifting is only 
hindered by applications implementing RMS. Time shifting is also possible. 
However, platform shifting is not that easy, as it requires Microsoft to support 
RMS in the target platform, and requires applications in the target platform to 
be RMS enabled. Thus, we have to score RMS low on platform portability 
especially if one considers the fact that Microsoft does not support RMS on 
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every version of Windows (even if legacy operating systems such as Windows 
98 are excluded). RMS can be integrated with any application, but every 
application requires be patching or upgrading to enable even the basic 
protections like read and write, which cannot be enforced by the operating 
system. However, the use of application support does allow for very fine 
grained and flexible access control specifications which can control any part of 
the application behaviour. Rights can be delegated but it requires the 
repackaging of the protected media, which could be expensive operation 
considering the size of certain documents such as presentations. 
RMS has a comprehensive tracking and monitoring system, and it can be 
configured to handle various levels of data. Offline usage is possible, but 
depends on the flexibility of Active Directory or Passport to enable offline 
usage. 
4.3.4 Legal and Social Requirement Analysis 
Unlike media DRM systems, enterprise DRM systems are on a sounder 
legal footing, as they regulate the control of corporate data, often within a 
closed boundary. However, it is unknown how sound their legal footing is, 
especially when one considers different legislations with regards to employee 
privacy, monitoring of employees and employee access to information. In terms 
of transparency, there are no clear mechanisms on establishing the extent of the 
protections placed on the data without application support. There is no 
performance data with RMS, thus it cannot be rated. 
4.4 Adobe Document Security 
Adobe’s DRM system was one of the earliest implementations in the 
consumer space. Originally (and still) used for Adobe’s eBook format, Adobe’s 
DRM system is now also available to enterprises. Unlike some of the DRM 
systems mentioned previously, Adobe Document Security provides protection 
for only one file format – PDF. But, the DRM system is the only system that 
can claim to support a wide range of platforms, from portable devices to 
different desktop architectures and operating systems. The details of the system 
are summarised from public documents published by Adobe [9][6][7]. 
4.4.1 Brief Overview 
Adobe’s DRM solution has two components – a server to create secure 
documents, and Adobe’s popular PDF rendering application: Acrobat Reader. 
Note that, not all versions of the reader can access protected files, but Adobe 
does have capable readers for a number of different platforms. Documents are 
encrypted using symmetric keys, and these keys are protected in the license 
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using the user’s public key. The user’s private key serves as the authentication 
mechanism, as well as the means to extract the symmetric key to decrypt 
content. It is therefore possible to use super-distribution since use licenses are 
separated from the content. 
Adobe does not retain control over the chain of trust – Acrobat Readers are 
capable of installing new certificate authorities, and trusted users; which means 
that there is no reason to enforce any restrictions for creating secure documents. 
Adobe’s approach does have one flaw – there is no restriction on the user 
distributing multiple copies of his/her private keys across the Internet; thus 
allowing more than one person access to the protected data. To counter this, 
Adobe’s system allows for tracking usage and access of the protected data. 
4.4.2 Core Requirement Analysis 
Access control is not governed by the distribution of the data, and access to 
protected data is not confined to a defined boundary; and thus persistent access 
control is achieved. The system does not regulate device management, and 
while digital certificates provide user identity control, this control can be 
replicated and does not provide any advanced identity system functionality such 
as groups or roles. Revocation of licenses, once issued, is virtually impossible 
as the licenses can easily be replicated and restored if revoked. The system does 
have mechanisms to update rights through issuing new licenses (which most 
probably invalidate existing licenses). 
4.4.3 Usability Requirement Analysis 
Adobe provides protection on only one document format – PDF, and thus 
provides no means for format shifting, without loosing the protections. 
However, the system scores very well on other portability factors such as time 
shifting, space shifting and platform shifting. Because almost any document 
type can be converted into PDF, the system provides for easy integration to 
existing systems; although the rendering is restricted to only one application. 
The system provides for restricting any functionality provided by Adobe 
Reader, and thus scores well in this respect. 
4.4.4 Legal and Social Requirement Analysis 
Unlike media DRM systems, enterprise DRM systems are on a sounder 
legal footing, as they regulate the control of corporate data, often within a 
closed boundary. However, how sound their legal footing is, is unknown, 
especially when one considers different legislations with regards to employee 
privacy, monitoring of employees and employee access to information. 
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Furthermore, Adobe Document Security can be used as a media DRM system, 
but then the system’s legal footing needs to be examined in terms of the 
implementation. In terms of transparency, Adobe Reader can easily display all 
the restrictions placed on the data. There is no performance data therefore this 
cannot be rated. 
4.5 Consolidated Ratings Summary 
The consolidated ratings summary for the systems discussed in this paper is 
detailed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of our requirement ratings for the various DRM systems which we 
discussed in this paper 
 Requirement iTunes WM Adobe RMS 
1 Provide Persistent Protection 2 2 2 2 
2 Represent User Identity 1 0 1 2 
3 Support Multiple User Authentication Protocols 0 0 0 1 
4 Represent and Authenticate Resource Identity n/a n/a n/a 1 
5 Represent and Authenticate Device Identity 2 0 0 2 
6 Represent and Authenticate User Groups 0 0 0 2 
7 Represent and Authenticate User Roles 0 0 0 2 
8 Represent and Authenticate Resource Groups 0 0 0 0 
9 Represent and Authenticate Device Groups 0 0 0 0 
10 Represent the Authorisation (Use License) 0 2 2 2 
11 Authenticate the Use License 0 1 2 1 
12 Support User Duties 0 0 0 0 
13 Revocation of Rights 1 1 0 1 
14 Update of Rights 1 1 2 1 
15 Time Shifting 0 2 2 2 
16 Format Shifting 1 1 0 2 
17 Space Shifting 2 0 2 2 
18 Platform Shifting 1 1 2 1 
19 Integration with Existing Applications 0 1 1 0 
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20 Delegation of Rights 0 0 0 1 
21 Fine Grained and Flexible Access Control Specification 0 1 2 2 
22 Tracking and Monitoring 0 n/a 2 2 
23 Offline Usage 2 2 2 1 
24 A Legal Framework for DRM 0 0 1 1 
25 Transparency 2 n/a 2 1 
26 Privacy and Anonymity 2 n/a n/a n/a 
27 Do Not Alter Platform Functionality 
and Performance 2 1 n/a n/a 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have discussed 27 requirements for a generalised DRM 
systems, which we have drawn from a broad number of different sources. These 
requirements are categorised into three categories: the core requirements for 
access control, usability requirements and the legal and social requirements. We 
have discussed each requirement in detail, together with our motivations 
regarding their importance in DRM systems. As the categories imply, not all of 
the requirements are necessary to achieve persistent access control, but, these 
additional requirements provide a greater usability of the DRM system for all 
the parties involved. 
We also evaluated four different DRM systems, and our ratings are 
summarised in table 1. We focused our analysis on how easily the systems can 
be used as general DRM systems instead of focusing on the consumer 
evaluation of DRM systems, as Mulligan et al. did in [42]. 
Our analysis shows a few clear general issues: 
1. DRM systems do not focus on users and thus have very poor user-
management systems. Microsoft RMS is designed for enterprises 
and is the notable exception. User management is a crucial 
component of access control and the lack of user management 
shows the immaturity of most of these solutions. 
2. Using device identity as the base for identity management is clearly 
the popular approach, despite the fact that users own and operate a 
number of different devices; and in fact a single device can be 
owned and operated by multiple users. The use of device groups 
have been ignored even when the vendors of the DRM systems 
market a number of different devices capable of rendering protected 
data. Furthermore, electronic devices often have short lifespans 
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(when compared to analogue media) but restrictions on space and 
platform portability severely hamper the user experience. 
3. Revocation and change of access rights is also important in any 
access control schemes; and DRM systems have rather poor support 
for both of these. DRM systems currently revoke entire devices or 
users instead of focusing on individual resources; and in the long 
run this is not a sustainable strategy. 
4. Vendors of DRM systems do not advertise, and possibly do not 
understand, the legal and social requirements for their systems. 
Vendors like Microsoft who want to license their systems need to 
set up clear guidelines on what consumers expect from DRM 
protected media. 
We believe that a successful DRM system needs to successfully address all 
the requirements we have outlined. Unfortunately, as we summarised in table 1, 
none of these systems have satisfied more than 50% of the requirements 
completely. One of the major benefits of the evaluation framework we have 
presented, is that we can track the progress of current and emerging DRM 
systems as they evolve. 
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